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I. INTRODUCTION
Before March 24, 2009, Citizens United v. FEC seemed to be
on its way to becoming nothing more than a footnote in election
law casebooks. While observers carefully noted that the case
could be a vehicle for overturning key campaign finance
precedents, most commentators focused on the various ways the
Court could instead decide the case on narrow statutory
interpretation grounds.2 Apparently agreeing that the Court
would probably not revisit those precedents, groups supporting
the existing laws filed only two amicus curiae briefs defending
the existing laws as applied by the government to Citizens
United.3
A lengthy exchange during the March 2009 oral argument
raised concerns, however, that a majority of the Court might take
a different approach to the case. 4  In that exchange, the
1. 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008).
2. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Can McCain-Feingold Restrict a
Corporation's "Video-on-Demand" Candidate Documentary and Advertising?, 36
PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 349, 353 (2009) (concluding that it is unlikely the
Court would overrule existing precedent especially given the many ways to rule
in favor of Citizens United without doing so); Isaac Lindbloom & Kelly
Terranova, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (Docket No. 08-
205), LEGAL INFO. INST BULL. (2009), http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-
205 (concluding that the Court would focus on whether the movie at issue in the
case would qualify for exemption from various campaign finance rules and not
raising the possibility that the Court could overrule existing precedent); Posting
of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/preview-
movies-as-political-messages/ (Mar. 22, 2009, 06:04 EDT) (concluding that while
it is not unrealistic to believe the Court could overturn long-standing precedent,
the Court has a variety of other ways to resolve the case on narrower grounds).
3. See Docket, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2009)
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docketl08-205.htm (briefs filed on Feb.
23 & 24, 2009). This compares to fourteen amicus curiae briefs filed in support
of the government after the Court scheduled re-argument. Id. (briefs filed on
July 29-31, 2009).
4. See, e.g., Bob Bauer, Something Distinctive About the Speech, MORE
SOFT MONEY HARD LAW, Mar. 28, 2009, http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com
(commenting that "[t]he Court in this case, on these facts, could well be moved
to keep the campaign finance laws out of the regulation of books and films");
Citizens United: Of Book Banning, Kindles, and the Corporate PAC
Requirement, http://electionlawblog.org (Mar. 24, 2009, 13:16 PDT) (concluding
that this exchange made "it more likely that a majority on the Court . . . will
want to say something about the Constitution"); Posting of Lyle Denniston to
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government took the position that Congress could,
constitutionally, prohibit corporations from paying for a broad
range of speech if that speech expressly advocated for the election
or defeat of a particular candidate or was the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.5 In one particularly striking
example, the government maintained this position even with
respect to a 500-page book that contained a single instance of
express advocacy.6
Whether triggered by this exchange or by already existing
concerns, the Court decided at the end of its Term to shift the
focus of the case. In a brief order issued on June 29, 2009, the
Court scheduled re-argument and ordered supplemental briefing
on the following issue:
For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court
overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which
addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 2 U.S.C. §441b.7
To understand why this one sentence could lead to a
significant change in the flow of corporate money affecting
federal and state elections, a brief review of the shifting-but for
almost all of the past 100 years-gradually tightening laws
governing the use of corporate funds in elections is necessary.
Part II of this Article covers this history, including the key
decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce to uphold a
SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-campaign-films-may-get-
ok (Mar. 24, 2009, 10:43 EDT) (leading off with "[b]ecause a government lawyer
pushed his argument as far as logic would carry it, an alarmed Supreme Court
on Tuesday seemed poised to create a new exception to federal power to
regulate what advocacy groups can say during national political campaigns" but
then noting there appeared to be little support for a dramatic overruling of
existing campaign finance laws).
5. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-38, Citizens United, No. 08-205
(U.S. Mar. 24, 2009). The Government also made this argument with respect to
unions paying for such speech, as the same provisions that apply to unions also
apply to corporations. Id.
6. Id. at 29-30.




state election law ban on corporations making certain election-
related expenditures even though that ban burdened speech.8
Part III reviews the specific facts and issues raised in Citizens
United. Part IV addresses how the Court is likely to answer the
new question it has posed. That part concludes that, given the
stated and likely positions of the current nine Justices, it is likely
that a majority of the current Court believes the Court decided
both Austin and the relevant part of McConnell incorrectly.
Given this likely result, the argument that is most likely to
convince a majority of the Court not to overturn Austin is the
doctrine of stare decisis, although that result is far from assured.
As detailed in that part, even stare decisis is unlikely to preserve
the relevant portion of McConnell, however. Finally, Part V
addresses the potential ramifications if the Court overrules
either or both of the precedents it cited, including the new
pressure an overruling of Austin would place on seemingly
unrelated federal tax laws governing tax-exempt, nonprofit
corporations.
As the title of this Article indicates and the discussion below
will make clear, the existing prohibitions on corporate money in
elections do not prevent all corporate spending that may
influence who is elected. That said, a significant amount of
corporate expenditures that might otherwise occur is currently
barred. The question now effectively posed by the Court in
raising the continued viability of the Austin and McConnell
precedents is what will be the results of breaching the dam
holding back much of this spending. In one view, such a breach
will result in a flood of corporate money that will drown out the
influence of individual voters, unduly influence candidates when
they reach public office, and undermine our democracy to such an
extent that the infringement on speech by the current
prohibitions on corporate spending are justified constitutionally.9
Another view is that such a breach will allow speech to flow that
should never have been barred in the first place and that will
enrich the electoral process, and that the harm to free speech of
8. 494 U.S. 652, 658-61 (1990).
9. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. _, 127
S.Ct. 2652, 2688-89 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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allowing the current prohibitions to remain intact more than
justifies overturning these precedents, even taking stare decisis
into account. 10  This Article explores these sharply different
views as they come to bear on the Citizens United case.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATE MONEY &
ELECTIONS
Both the public and politicians have long been uneasy with
spending by corporations to influence elections, and not without
reason.l" This uneasiness has led to a series of attempts to limit
this influence, which have increasingly blocked the flow of
corporate funds over time. At the same time, the Supreme Court
has had to address numerous constitutional challenges to these
restrictions, of which the Citizens United case is the most recent.
The litigants bringing these challenges have primarily argued
that these restrictions restrict speech without sufficient
justification, thereby violating the Constitution's speech
protections, denying the public important information about
candidates, and unduly protecting incumbent politicians.12
A. Election-Related Spending by Corporations
To understand this history, it is necessary to distinguish the
three primary ways that corporations-or other types of
organizations or individuals-can spend money to influence the
election of candidates. One way is to make campaign
10. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 273-75 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 322-23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
11. See generally ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS:
THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAw 1-52 (1988) (describing the
pre-Watergate influence of corporations on federal elections and the concerns it
raised with members of both the public and Congress).
12. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 7-14, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1675) (arguing in a case consolidated with McConnell v.
FEC, that BCRA § 203 is unconstitutional on these grounds); Brief of Appellee
at 8-9, Austin, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (No. 88-1569) (arguing that the ban on
corporate independent expenditures is unconstitutional on these grounds,
except not mentioning incumbent politicians); Reply Brief of the Appellants at
30-31, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437) (arguing that
expenditure limits are unconstitutional on these grounds).
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contributions, i.e., to contribute funds to a candidate's campaign.
Such contributions can be made either directly by simply writing
a check to the candidate's campaign committee or indirectly by
following the candidate's instructions with respect to spending
money. For example, a candidate could ask a corporation
interested in supporting the candidate to write a check to a
television station to pay for one of the candidate's ads. Such
indirect contributions have come to be known as coordinated
expenditures, and under current law, such expenditures are
treated the same as direct contributions.13
Second, a corporation can contribute to an entity that is
closely tied to a candidate and will support that candidate or
other candidates. The most obvious such entity would be the
candidate's political party. Another common entity of this type is
a leadership PAC, which is an entity formed and controlled by a
current or former politician to support the election of candidates
other than the founding individual, thereby garnering favor with
the candidates supported.14
Third and finally, a corporation can spend money on
activities that support (or oppose) a candidate independently of
the candidate, i.e., without any previous agreement with or
direction from the candidate. In other words, instead of
contributing to the candidate or an entity closely tied to a
candidate, the corporation is making its own independent
expenditures. Such independent expenditures could be made
directly or by contributing to another organization, not affiliated
with a candidate, that then makes the expenditures.
B. Prohibiting Corporate Campaign Contributions
The first major limitation enacted by Congress was the 1907
prohibition on corporations making campaign contributions to
13. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.52(a), (d)(1), 109.20(b), 109.21(b)(1) (2009). The
FEC is currently revising 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 in light of a court holding that
portions of that section violated the Administrative Procedure Act. See Shays v.
FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 924-29 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
14. See Trevor Potter, The Current State of Campaign Finance Law, in THE
NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 48, 52 (2005) (describing leadership
PACs).
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federal candidates.15 Stung by public revelations of substantial
corporate contributions to the Republic National Committee
during congressional hearings, President Theodore Roosevelt in
1905 called for such a prohibition during his annual address to
Congress.16 After much political maneuvering, and another call
for action by President Roosevelt in his 1906 annual address,
Congress passed the prohibition.17 The limited history available
indicates that only two members of Congress raised free speech
objections, claiming that corporations had the same rights as
individuals.18 And in contrast to more recent campaign finance
laws, the issue of the prohibition's constitutionality did not reach
the Supreme Court for many decades (and was upheld when it
did).19
The corporation campaign contributicn prohibition still exists
today, and almost all states either prohibit or limit contributions
by corporations to state and local candidates.20 This campaign
contribution prohibition did not, however, prevent corporations
15. See Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a) (2006)). Congress extended this prohibition to unions in 1943, see
War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, sec. 9, § 313, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943), and
similar prohibitions now apply to government contractors, 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1)
(2006), and foreign nationals who are not permanent residents, id. § 441e.
16. MUTCH, supra note 11, at 2-4; Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A
History of Federal Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE
SOURCEBOOK 7, 10-12 (2005).
17. MUTCH, supra note 11, at 5-7; Corrado, supra note 16, at 12; see also
United States v. Int'l. Union United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement
Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 570-75 (1957) (describing this history); Brief of
Campaign Finance Scholars as Amicus Curiae at 7-10, Citizens United v. FEC,
No. 08-205 (U.S. July 31, 2009) (criticizing certain aspects of this Supreme
Court case's account of this history).
18. MUTCH, supra note 11, at 7.
19. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (finding the prohibition on
corporate campaign contributions to be constitutional even as applied to
nonprofit corporations and citing previous decisions as strongly suggesting this
result); see also Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 771-73 (3d Cir. 2000)
(concluding, before Beaumont, that no Supreme Court precedent has directly
addressed the constitutionality of the corporate campaign contributions
prohibition, but finding that prohibition constitutional and citing other federal
appellate court decisions to the same effect).
20. See supra note 15; National Conference of State Legislatures, State
Limits on Contributions to Candidates (2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org
Portals/1/documentsflegismgt/limitscandidates.pdf.
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from making contributions to political parties or other candidate-
affiliated entities. It also left corporations free to make
independent expenditures.
C. Prohibiting Independent Expenditures
Forty years later, Congress sought to close off the latter of
these alternate channels by prohibiting independent
expenditures by corporations (and unions).21 That prohibition
proved largely ineffective, however, because there were no
effective disclosure or enforcement mechanisms.22 It was not
until the post-Watergate amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) that Congress made serious efforts to
address both of these problems.23 FECA, as amended,
strengthened the prohibition on corporations making
independent expenditures both by eliminating loopholes and by
establishing a dedicated enforcement agency in the form of the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).24 In contrast to the ban on
corporate contributions, however, a majority of states do not
prohibit corporations (or unions) from making independent
expenditure, although they do generally require public disclosure
of such expenditures.25
21. See Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947 § 304, 61
Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)); MUTCH, supra
note 11, at 155-57.
22. MUTCH, supra note 11, at 40-42, 165-66; FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY IN
AMERICAN ELECTIONS 32-33 (1988).
23. MUTCH, supra note 11, at 42, 49.
24. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 836-37, 904-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(briefly summarizing the history of federal election law and the reasons for the
FECA amendments), affd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); MUTCH,
supra note 11, at 87-88 (describing the creation of the FEC). That is not to say
that the FEC has been unanimously viewed as a model regulatory or
enforcement agency; far from it. See, e.g., BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE:
WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION FAILED (1990); Todd Lochner & Bruce
E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1895-96 (1999) (summarizing the concerns of FEC critics);
Trevor Potter & Glen Shor, Lessons on Enforcement from McConnell v. FEC, 3
ELECTION L.J. 325, 330-32 (2004) (citing McConnell as an indictment of the
FEC's performance in interpreting the election laws).
25. See Supplemental Brief of Senator John McCain et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellee at la-8a, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (U.S. July
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The effectiveness of the federal prohibition was, however,
reduced by the results of litigation challenging FECA, primarily
on First Amendment grounds. Unlike the corporate campaign
contribution prohibition, which did not result in a constitutional
challenge for many years, 26 the FECA amendments immediately
triggered far-ranging litigation that culminated in the Supreme
Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo.27 While that decision
focused primarily on the restrictions imposed on individuals, it
had two important ramifications for corporate spending.
First, Buckley created a fundamental divide between how
contributions to candidates are treated and how expenditures by
candidates, political parties, and individuals are treated.28 The
Court found that the government had a weighty interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and that
the FECA-imposed limits on the amount that any given
individual could contribute to a candidate per election were
sufficiently tailored to that interest to justify the resulting
burden on speech under the First Amendment.29 The Court also
concluded, however, that FECA's limits on the total amount of
31, 2009) (listing state statutes prohibiting corporate independent
expenditures); Public Citizen, State Prohibitions on Campaign Spending from
Corporate And Union Treasuries for State Candidates, 2009, http://www.citizen.
org/documents/Corporate-spending-on state candidates.pdf (last visited Sept.
18, 2009); National Conference of State Legislatures, State Campaign Finance
Laws: An Overview 3 (2009), available at http://www.ilga.gov (follow "Joint
Committee on Government Reform" hyperlink; then follow "Documents"
hyperlink; then follow "State Campaign Finance Laws, An Overview" hyperlink
under "Submitted March 17, 2009") (summarizing state independent
expenditure disclosure laws).
26. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (finding the prohibition on
corporate campaign contributions to be constitutional even as applied to
nonprofit corporations and citing previous decisions as strongly suggesting this
result); see also Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 771-73 (3d Cir. 2000)
(concluding, before Beaumont, that no Supreme Court precedent has directly
addressed the constitutionality of the corporate campaign contributions
prohibition, but finding that prohibition constitutional and citing other federal
appellate court decisions to the same effect).
27. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
28. See id. at 58-59 (summarizing the Court's contrasting conclusions with
respect to contribution limits and expenditure limits).
29. Id. at 26-29; see also id. at 35-36 (finding constitutional the limits on
contributions to political committees); id. at 38 (finding constitutional the limit
on total contributions by a single individual during any calendar year).
expenditures by a candidate, political committee, political party,
or individual in a given election cycle were not sufficiently
tailored to serve this interest, and therefore found those limits to
be an unconstitutional restriction of speech.30 In doing so, the
Court rejected the view that limits on contributions and
expenditures should be viewed primarily as limitations on
conduct (i.e., spending money) and only incidentally as
restrictions on speech and so outside the protection of the First
Amendment (as the appellate court had reasoned).31
In other words, while Congress could constitutionally
prohibit an individual from giving more than $1,000 per election,
primary or general, to a candidate for federal office, Congress
could not constitutionally limit the amount that the candidate
could spend.32 Moreover, Congress also could not limit how much
any individual could spend of his or her own funds on
independent expenditures, including expenditures to support his
or her own candidacy-hence the existence of self-funded political
campaigns by candidates such as Ross Perot and Mitt Romney.33
In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly rejected the
assertion that ensuring some level of financial equality among
candidates or other electoral voices was a legitimate ground for
overcoming First Amendment protections, much less a
sufficiently strong governmental interest to justify FECA's
expenditure limitations.34 It stated:
But the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which
30. Id. at 55-56.
31. Id. at 16-17. But see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976).
32. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-24 (describing the limit on contributions to
candidates).
33. See id. at 45, 46 n.53, 47, 53; FEC, Presidential Pre-Nomination
Campaign Receipts Through December 31, 2008 (2009), http://www.fec.gov/pres
s/press2009/20090608Pres/2_2008PresPrimaryCmpgnRcpts.pdf (reporting that
Perot contributed over $63 million to his own presidential campaign and listing
Romney as having provided over $44 million in contributions and loans to his
own presidential campaign); HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & ANTHONY CORRADO,
FINANCING THE 1992 ELECTION 128 (1995).
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49, 54, 56.
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was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people. The First
Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of
free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a
person's financial ability to engage in public discussion. 35
The ironic aspect of Buckley's contribution-expenditure divide
is that it appears a majority of Supreme Court Justices now
agree it is wrong, but they disagree over whether limits on
contributions and on expenditures are both constitutional or both
unconstitutionally infringe on speech.36 The effect of this
disagreement is that it leaves the contributions-expenditure
divide in place, at least for now.
Second, to avoid unconstitutional vagueness the Court
narrowed the definition of what qualified as an independent
expenditure to include only communications that expressly
advocated for the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate.37 It arguably further narrowed this definition by
listing examples of what came to be known as the "magic words"
that would trigger express advocacy treatment.38 While the FEC
35. Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted).
36. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (expressing skepticism regarding Buckley); id. at 266-67 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (reiterating his view that the Court erred in Buckley by not also
holding contribution limits unconstitutional) (joined by Scalia, J.); id. at 274
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Buckley's holding on expenditure
limits); id. at 283-84 (Souter, J., dissenting) (while not explicitly disagreeing
with Buckley's rationale, suggesting that three decades of experience might
provide sufficient grounds for upholding at least some expenditure limits as
constitutional) (joined by Ginsburg, J.); see also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. _,
128 S. Ct. 2759, 2782-83 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (choosing not to join Justice Stevens criticism of Buckley because she
"would leave reconsideration of Buckley for a later day and case") (joined by
Breyer, J.); Randall, 548 U.S. at 264 (Alito, J., concurring) (neither endorsing
nor criticizing Buckley); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409-10
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that he would overrule Buckley but
would not necessarily find all campaign finance limitations to be
unconstitutional as a result). Cf. Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is
Basically Right, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095 (2002).
37. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43-44, 80.
38. Id. at 44 n.52 ("This construction would restrict the application of
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has repeatedly sought to push the boundaries of this latter
limitation, those attempts have generally been unsuccessful9
Buckley did not expressly apply this holding to the prohibition on
independent expenditures by corporations (and unions), but the
Supreme Court later made it clear that this narrowed definition
of such expenditures also applies to that prohibition.40
While Buckley did not directly address the FECA-imposed
limits on corporate spending, two later Supreme Court decisions
did. The first was FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.41
(MCFL), where a nonprofit corporation brought an as applied
challenge to the application of the corporate independent
expenditure prohibition.42 Recognizing a difference between for-
profit corporations and at least some nonprofit corporations, the
Court determined that the Constitution required a limited
exception to the prohibition.43 It concluded that a nonprofit
organization like Massachusetts Citizens for Life, which was not
established by and does not accept funds from business
corporations and unions, does not have shareholders or other
persons with a claim on its assets or earnings, does not engage in
business activities, and has an explicit political agenda, had to be
permitted to make independent expenditures as a constitutional
matter. 44 The Court also held, however, that such corporations
[FECA § 608(e)(1) to communications containing express words of advocacy of
election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith
for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."').
39. See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2009) (defining express advocacy as
including communications that "[w]hen taken as a whole and with limited
reference to external events . . . could only be interpreted by a reasonable
person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly
identified candidate(s)"); N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, Inc., 344 F.3d 418, 426
(4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting this broader definition of express advocacy as adopted
by one federal appellate court and listing other federal appellate court decisions
also rejecting a broader definition), vacated on other grounds, 541 US. 1007
(2004); see generally Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers, Speech Governed by
Federal Election Laws in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK, 205, 213-
17 (2005).
40. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986).
41. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
42. Id at 238.
43. Id. at 263-64.
44. Id.
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are still subject to the FECA-imposed disclosure requirements
imposed on those who make independent expenditures, including
the filing of publicly available reports detailing both their
significant sources of contributions and their expenditures.45
These so-called MCFL corporations are likely a relatively
small group in practice both because of the Supreme Court-
imposed requirements and the additional requirements imposed
by the FEC in its interpretation of the case. Under current FEC-
issued regulations, not only must a nonprofit corporation meet
the requirements described by the Supreme Court, but it must
also meet two additional, arguably more stringent requirements
(both of which MCFL itself apparently met).46 First, to fall
within this exception the nonprofit corporation must be tax-
exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(4), which
provides exemptions for "social welfare" organizations and covers
many advocacy groups such as the National Rifle Association and
the Sierra Club.47 Second, the corporation must not offer or
provide any benefit, such as insurance or training programs not
necessary to promoting the corporation's political ideas, that is a
disincentive to persons disassociating themselves from the
organization.48 It is therefore relatively easy to be disqualified
from this status; for example, Citizens United does not fall
within this status because it receives a relatively small amount
of its support from business corporations.49
Second, the Court squarely faced the issue of whether the
45. Id. at 262.
46. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c) (2009).
47. See id. § 114.10(c)(5); PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE NEW STEALTH PACs:
TRACKING 501(c) NON-PROFIT GROUPS ACTIVE IN ELECTIONS 109, 118 (2004)
(identifying the National Rifle Association and the Sierra Club as Internal
Revenue Code section 501(c)(4) organizations), available at http://www.stealthp
acs.org/documents/StealthPACs.pdf.
48. 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c)(3).
49. See Brief for the Appellee at 30, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205
(U.S. Feb. 17, 2009) (noting that in its complaint Citizens United stated it was
not an MCFL corporation because it received corporate donations and engaged
in business activities); Brief for Appellant at 32-33, Citizens United, No. 08-205
(U.S. Jan. 8, 2009) (while arguing for application of the MCFL exception,
admitting that a very small (less than one percent) of the funding for the movie
at issue came from for-profit corporations and not stating to what extent for-
profit corporations provided financial support to Citizens United generally).
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prohibition on corporate, as opposed to individual, independent
expenditures is constitutional in the first case mentioned in the
Court's recent order: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.50
That case involved whether a state law prohibition on such
expenditures, modeled on FECA, could survive scrutiny under
the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause.51 The case
was further complicated by the fact that the Court had, in the
interim, decided that a state law prohibition on certain corporate
paid speech in connection with ballot initiative elections was
unconstitutional. 52
In First National Bank v. Bellotti,53 the Court held that the
fact the speaker is a corporation instead of an individual was
irrelevant to the constitutional free speech analysis.54 In doing
so, it took the position that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of the source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual,"55 and that the government could not limit a
corporation's speech to speech the corporation could prove had a
material effect on its business or property.5 6 Having found that
corporate-funded speech was as deserving, at least in the ballot
initiative context, as individual speech, the Court then went on to
conclude that the prohibition did not sufficiently serve an
important governmental interest to justify the speech restriction,
because it found that there was no risk of corruption present in a
vote on a public issue as opposed to a vote on candidates57 Only
then-Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the Court's position that
the type of speaker was irrelevant, and he appears to have later
abandoned that position.58
50. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
51. Id. at 654-55 & n.1.
52. Id. at 699-700.
53. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
54. Id. at 776-77.
55. Id. at 777.
56. Id. at 784.
57. Id. at 790.
58. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 328 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Continued adherence to Austin, of
course, cannot be justified by the corporate identity of the speaker.") (joined by
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Nevertheless, in Austin the Court upheld the state law
prohibition on corporate independent expenditures. It did so by
applying what is now commonly referred to as the "non-
distortion" theory: that the government has a strong interest in
preventing the large accumulations of wealth made possible by
the special legal benefits available to corporations-separate
legal status, limited liability for owners, etc.-from distorting
elections for public office.59 The Court further supported this
rationale by noting corporations generally accumulated wealth
for reasons unrelated to their political positions.60 The Court
distinguished Bellotti on the grounds that in that case the Court
only considered quid pro quo corruption and not the distorting
corruption accepted as a governmental interest in Austin.61
Several of the Justices felt, however, that the non-distortion
theory was a stretch from the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption rationale applied in Buckley and
dangerously close to the equalization of speakers rationale
rejected in that case. 62  Despite these concerns, Austin has
remained the controlling precedent for almost twenty years,
subject only to the previously created MCFL exception.
It should be noted that corporations were, and still are, also
permitted to create political committees or PACs of their own and
to pay the administrative and fundraising costs of those PACs,
but those PACs can only receive contributions from individuals
who have certain connections to the corporation and only up to
certain dollar limits per individual per election cycle.63 (A
Rehnquist, C.J.); Bellotti, 594 U.S. at 828.
59. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
For a fascinating account of the Austin opinion drafting process, written by the
"clerk with primary responsibility to work with Justice Marshall on this
opinion," see Elizabeth Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice Marshall's
Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 HOWARD L.J. 655, 669-78 & n.70 (2009).
60. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for expanding
the concept of corruption); id. at 705-06 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for apparently accepting that government has a legitimate interest
in equalizing the relative influence of speakers) (joined by O'Connor, J. and
Scalia, J.).
63. See generally FEC, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR CORPORATIONS AND LABOR
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political committee, commonly known as a PAC, is generally an
entity formed for the major purpose of influencing federal
elections and that either receives at least a $1,000 of
contributions for that purpose or makes at least a $1,000 of
expenditures for that purpose.64) This means that the funds
these PACs can spend to influence federal elections, whether by
making contributions to candidates or by paying for independent
expenditures, cannot come from the general treasury of their
affiliated corporations, but only from individuals related to the
relevant corporation, such as senior executives, shareholders,
and, for nonprofit corporations, members.65
FECA, as interpreted by the Court, therefore left two
significant ways for corporations to spend their general treasury
funds to influence elections. First, while FECA prohibited
corporate contributions to candidates and PACs, including
leadership PACs, it did not reach some types of contributions to
political parties: funds not raised specifically to influence federal
elections.66 Such funds, along with all other funds not subject to
FECA's limitations on sources and amounts of contributions, are
commonly known as "soft money;" "hard money," in contrast, is
subject to those limitations and so is harder to raise.67 The
parties eventually realized they could use these soft money
contributions for non-express advocacy advertising and other
activities relating to federal elections but that did not fall under
FECA, and that corporations generally remained free to provide
these soft money contributions.68 Second, because of the Court's
ORGANIZATIONS (2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf.
64. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2009) (establishing the contribution and
expenditure thresholds); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976) (adding the
requirement that to be classified as a political committee, an entity must either
be controlled by a candidate or have "the major purpose" of nominating or
electing a candidate).
65. FEC, supra note 63, at 5, 20-23.
66. See Corrado, supra note 16, at 32-33 (describing the growth of such
contributions and expenditures).
67. See id. at 29.
68. Id. at 32-33; Diana Dwyre & Robin Kolodny, National Political Parties
After BCRA, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT MEETS POLITICS 83, 84 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003); see also Robert G.
Boatright et al., BCRA's Impact on Interest Groups and Advocacy
[Volume 4
Breaching a Leaking Dam?
narrow express advocacy definition, corporations also remained
free to spend money independently as long as such spending did
not fall within that definition.69 For example, an oft-repeated
example of a communication that did not constitute express
advocacy but certainly left the listener with few doubts about
whether to vote for the candidate mentioned is this ad that aired
shortly before a 1996 Montana congressional election:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but took a
swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's response? He only slapped
her. But "her nose was not broken." He talks of law and order
... but is himself a convicted felon. And though he talks about
protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make his own child
support payments - then voted against child support
enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family
values. 70
While it took almost twenty years for candidates, political
parties, and corporations to identify and begin to significantly
utilize these channels, substantial funds eventually began to flow
through these holes in the corporate spending dam, leading
Congress to try to block them.71
D. Prohibiting Soft Money Contributions to Political Parties and
Expenditures for "Electioneering Communications"
In 2002, six years of concerted efforts by members of
Congress to place tighter restrictions on these two remaining
flows of corporate money into federal elections finally bore fruit.72
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) prohibited
corporate contributions to political parties for federal election
activities (now defined broadly) and prohibited corporate funding
Organizations, in LIFE AFrER REFORM, supra, at 43, 49-51 (describing the scale
and sources of soft money contributions to political parties).
69. See Boatright, supra note 68, at 52-56 (describing such "issue
advertising" efforts).
70. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 194 n.78 (2003).
71. See Michael J. Malbin, Thinking about Reform, in LIFE AFrER REFORM,
supra note 68, at 3, 4-6.
72. See Anthony Corrado, The Legislative Odyssey of BCRA, in LIFE AFTER
REFORM, supra note 68, at 21.
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of some, but not all, communications relating to candidates in the
days shortly before an election.73 More specifically, § 203 of
BCRA prohibited corporations from paying for so-called
"electioneering communications": broadcast, cable, or satellite
communications that clearly identified a candidate, which aired
within sixty days of the general election (thirty days for primary
elections), and which reached at least 50,000 people in the
relevant electorate.74 BCRA also required disclaimers on such
communications which identified the party paying for them, and
public disclosure of contributions to that party and expenditures
by it relating to such communications above certain dollar
thresholds.75 BCRA did not, however, reach other forms of
communication, such as newspaper ads, telephone phone banks,
direct mail, or Internet communications, although its supporters
had originally hoped for a broader scope. 76
Numerous plaintiffs, including Citizens United, challenged
the BCRA-imposed restrictions on constitutional grounds,
including as violations of the First Amendment's speech
protection.77 In McConnell v. FEC,78 however, the Supreme
Court upheld all of BCRA's major provisions, including the ban
on corporate contributions to political parties for federal election
activity and on corporate funding of electioneering
73. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 §§ 101, 203, 116
Stat. 81, 82-86, 91-92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 441b, 441i (2006)).
74. See BCRA § 201, 116 Stat. at 89-90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)
(2006)) (defining "electioneering communication").
75. See BCRA §§ 201, 311, 116 Stat. at 88-89, 105-06 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 434(f) (disclosure provisions covering contributors who contribute $1,000 or
more in aggregate and disbursements of more than $200), 441d(a) (disclaimer
provisions) (2006)).
76. See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 417,
106th Cong. § 201(b)(20)(A)(iii) (1999) (expanding the definition of express
advocacy to include any communication "expressing unmistakable and
unambiguous support for or opposition to one or more clearly identified
candidates when taken as a whole and with limited reference to external
events").
77. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 220-21 n.55 (D.D.C. 2003)
(listing the seventy-seven plaintiffs, including Citizens United), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Supplemental Brief for the Appellee at 5,
Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (U.S. July 24, 2009).
78. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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communications, albeit by five-to-four votes with respect to these
holdings.79. The majority opinion finding BCRA § 203
constitutional on its face explicitly relied on Austin for its
conclusion and Austin's anti-distortion rationale.0
As was the case with Buckley, McConnell has not been the
last word with respect to the constitutionality of BCRA's
provisions, and BCRA's opponents have scored two partial
victories in later decisions on free speech grounds. In an as
applied challenge to the § 203 corporate funding ban for
electioneering communications, a nonprofit corporation convinced
the Court that the First Amendment required that the definition
of electioneering communications be limited. In FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc.S1 (WRTL), the principal opinion, authored by
Chief Justice Roberts, held that for these purposes the
prohibition could apply only to electioneering communications
that were the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy in that
they were not susceptible to any reasonable interpretation except
as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.82 The
opinion, which Justice Alito joined, rejected a broader definition
of electioneering communications, concluding that "[d]iscussion of
issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also
be pertinent in an election. Where the First Amendment is
implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor."83
Commentators and seven of the nine Justices have taken the
view that this narrowing of the constitutionally permitted
definition for electioneering communications effectively overruled
McConnell with respect to its BCRA § 203 holding, although the
principal opinion did not explicitly do so.8 4 The Court did not,
79. Id. at 93, 142-89 (2003) (upholding the- constitutionality of the soft
money provisions), 203-09 (upholding the prohibition on corporate (and union)
funding of electioneering communications).
80. Id. at 205 (quoting the non-distortion theory as stated in Austin).
81. 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
82. Id. at 2667, 2674.
83. Id. at 2669 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the principal opinion
effectively overrules McConnell without saying so) (joined by Kennedy, J. and
Thomas, J.); Id. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that the principal
opinion reaches the "unacknowledged" result of overruling McConnell's holding
that BCRA § 203 is facially constitutional) (joined by Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J.,
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however, reach the issue of whether this narrowed definition also
applied for purposes of the disclaimer and disclosure
requirements imposed on persons who pay for electioneering
communications, as the plaintiff had not apparently raised this
issue.8 5
Second, the Court struck down as unconstitutional BCRA's
so-called "millionaire's amendment" that had raised the
contribution limits for donations to candidates facing certain self-
funded opponents.8 6 In reaching this latter conclusion in Davis v.
FEC, the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, reiterated
the position taken over thirty-five years earlier in Buckley:
Equalizing the financial position of election voices is not
sufficiently important to justify infringement on speech.87 This
reasoning is important, as it could be critical in the Citizens
United case, which is the next challenge to the limitations on
corporate spending with respect to federal elections to be
considered by the Court.
III. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
Citizens United is a nonprofit membership corporation that
is tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(4).88 As
mentioned previously, while it receives the bulk of its funding
from individual donors, it also receives a relatively small amount
of contributions from for-profit corporations and so does not
qualify as a MCFL corporation under the existing FEC-issued
regulations implementing the MCFL decision.89 In 2007,
Citizens United produced a 90-minute movie titled Hillary: The
Movie, that to put it mildly, was not supportive of then-Senator
and Breyer, J.); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's
Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1096-
1103 (2008) (explaining why, as a practical matter, WRTL effectively overruled
McConnell with respect to BCRA § 203).
85. WRTL, 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. at 2661 (2007).
86. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2765 (2008).
87. Id. at 2773-74.
88. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008)
(denying motion for preliminary injunction).
89. See supra note 49.
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Clinton's candidacy for the presidency.90 The movie apparently
did not constitute "express advocacy," however, and so could
generally be funded by corporate funds.91
What brought Citizens United to court was a proposed use of
the movie and planned advertisements. The proposed use was
making the movie available nationwide through on-demand cable
television at a time that would fall within the thirty-day pre-
primary election electioneering communications window in many
states.92 The planned advertisements, which would be broadcast
on television, would also fall within one or more of the
electioneering communications windows, but the FEC did not
assert that these advertisements were functionally equivalent to
express advocacy.93 It therefore did not object to Citizens United
paying for such ads, but only to Citizens United refusing to
attach a disclaimer to those ads and disclosing its donors.94 This
objection arises from the FEC's position that WRTL did not
narrow the definition of "electioneering communications" for
purposes of either the disclaimer requirement or disclosure
requirements.95
A three-judge district court panel first heard Citizens
United's motion for preliminary injunction-which it denied96-
90. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 279-80 & n.12 (describing the
movie's contents, quoting various excerpts, and ultimately concluding that it
could not be reasonably interpreted as anything other than an appeal to vote
against presidential candidate Clinton); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note
49, at 35-38 (arguing that the movie is not an appeal to vote, not contesting
that it is critical of Hillary Clinton and noting it contains comments that are
highly critical of her qualifications for the presidency).
91. While the Government has not completely conceded this point, its
choice to focus solely on the argument that the movie is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy under the WRTL test as opposed to actual
express advocacy under the Buckley test strongly suggests the Government
believes proving the movie was express advocacy would be difficult at best. See
Brief for the Appellee, supra note 49, at 16-22 & n.6.
92. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
93. Id. at 280.
94. Id.
95. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,901 (Dec. 26,
2007) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 104, 114).
96. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (denying Citizen United's
motion for preliminary injunction).
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and then cross motions for summary judgment, which it decided
by granting the FEC's motion and denying Citizen United's.97
While the timing of the summary judgment decision-July
2008-made the on-demand use and ads at issue in the case moot
given then-Senator Barack Obama's nomination, the panel
apparently recognized that the issues raised by Citizens United
were capable of repetition and so should be addressed.98 The
panel concluded, based on its reasoning in its opinion denying the
motion for preliminary injunction, that the FEC should prevail,
finding that the movie was the functional equivalent of express
advocacy, concluding that on-demand cable distribution was
within the "broadcast, cable or satellite" communications
definition of electioneering communications in BCRA as
interpreted by the FEC, and agreeing with the FEC that WRTL
did not control with respect to the disclaimer and disclosure
requirements.99 Citizens United then exercised its right to
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.100
Both the parties' briefs and the briefs of the numerous amici
curiae assumed for the most part that the Court would decide the
appeal on relatively narrow grounds. For example, Citizens
United stated the questions presented as whether the corporate
funding prohibition for electioneering communication as applied
to the movie was constitutional and whether the disclaimer and
disclosure requirements as applied to the advertisements were
constitutional. 101 That is, Citizens United did not explicitly
challenge either the prohibition or the requirements on their face
but only with respect to these specific applications. And while
Citizens United did attack Austin, it did so using only slightly
97. Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, Mem. Op. at 1 (D.D.C. July 18,
2008) (granting FEC's motion for summary judgment).
98. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 49, at 14 n.3 (agreeing that the
appeal is not moot); see also WRTL, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2662-64
(2007) (discussing why the Court concluded the case fell within the disputes
capable of repetition exception to mootness).
99. See Citizens United, No. 07-2240, supra note 97, at 1 (incorporating the
reasoning of its prior opinion denying Citizens United's motion for preliminary
injunction); Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 n.6, 280-81
(D.D.C. 2008).
100. See BCRA § 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 114 (2002).
101. Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at i.
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more than a page of its opening brief.102 The Government's brief
was similarly limited, only briefly responding to the attack on
Austin and taking the McConnell decision with respect to
corporate funding of electioneering communications as a given,
while focusing primarily on the as applied challenges to BCRA's
applicability in this specific context.10 3 As for the thirteen amici
curiae briefs, eleven of which supported one or more aspects of
Citizens United's case, only two criticized the holding in Austin
and then did so only in passing.104
It was therefore reasonable for most observers to conclude
that while Austin was in theory on the table, even a decision in
Citizens United's favor would likely turn on narrower issues.105
In the wake of the oral argument, however, the Court had a
different view, ordering re-argument and supplemental briefing
on the continued validity of both McConnell's holding with
respect to BCRA § 203 and Austin. Thus, the Court set the stage
for striking down on free speech grounds the over sixty-year-old
ban on corporate funding of independent expenditures or, less
dramatically but still significantly, striking down the more recent
ban on corporate funding of electioneering communications that
the Court had found constitutional only six years earlier.106 The
next part discusses what the Court may in fact choose to do.
IV. WILL THE COURT OVERRULE AUSTIN OR (IN PART)
MCCONNELL?
As the above summary indicates, Citizens United presents a
host of legal issues and a similarly large number of paths that
the Court could take to resolve the question it posed on June
102. Id. at 30-31.
103. See Brief for the Appellee, supra note 49, at 33-36.
104. See Brief of the American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 19, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (U.S. Jan. 15,
2009) (criticizing the holding in Austin in a single paragraph); Brief of Chamber
of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at
24-25, Citizens United, No. 08-205 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2009) (arguing, in a little over
a page and in its second-to-last point, that Austin should be overruled or at
least not extended).
105. See supra note 2.
106. See Order in Pending Case, supra note 7.
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29th. It therefore is helpful to first set aside the possible but,
given its actions to date and the known positions of its various
members with respect to campaign finance issues, unlikely ways
that the Court could rule.
A. Avoiding the Issue
First, the Court could decide the case-whether for appellant
Citizens United or appellee FEC-on relatively narrow, technical
grounds that leave the fundamental structure of the nation's
campaign finance laws unchanged. For example, the Court could
conclude that a ninety-minute long movie that is only available
on demand is not the kind of cable communication that Congress
intended to bar corporations from funding under BCRA § 203.
Such a result would be consistent with the general
statutory interpretation canon of constitutional avoidance.107
Alternatively, the Court could conclude that regardless of
Congress's intent, BCRA § 203 cannot constitutionally be applied
to this type of communication.108 Or the Court could instead
incrementally expand the MCFL exception to include ideological
nonprofit corporations that receive only a relatively small portion
of their support from business corporations or to permit such
entities to pay for such communications up to the amount of their
donations from individuals and leave the larger question of
Austin's continued viability with respect to for-profit corporations
for another day, as urged by several amici and commentators.109
107. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. -, 129 S.
Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) (relying on the principle of constitutional avoidance); see
generally Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance on
the Roberts Court, 4-10 (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper, Working Paper No.
2009-23, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1436669.
108. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 22-29 (arguing that BCRA
§ 203 is unconstitutional as applied to a feature-length movie that is only
available on demand).
109. Supplemental Brief for The American Civil Rights Union as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant at 2-3, Citizens United, No. 08-205 (U.S. July 31,
2009); Brief of California First Amendment Coalition as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 2, Citizens United, No. 08-205 (U.S. July 31, 2009);
Brief of Independent Sector as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 11-
13, Citizens United, No. 08-205 (U.S. July 31, 2009); Brief of National Rifle
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The Government in fact argues that the Court must decide the
case on one of these narrow grounds because, even with
supplemental briefing, the validity of these precedents is not
properly before the Court at this time because of the limited
scope of the questions Citizens United presented in both its
jurisdictional statement and initial brief.11o This result seems
unlikely since the Court could have decided the case on such
narrow grounds without ordering re-argument and supplemental
briefing if it was so inclined or felt it had no choice but to do so.l"'
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that it appears such an
order required the support of a majority of the Court, indicating
that a majority of the Court is interested in reaching the more
foundational issues raised by the precedents listed in the
order. 112
B. The Known and Possible Views of the Justices
It is therefore more likely that the Court will choose to
address the continuing validity of Austin and the applicable part
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 2-3, Citizens United, No.
08-205 (U.S. July 31, 2009); Stuart Taylor Jr., The Justices Should Excise the
Unconstitutional Wellstone Amendment While Leaving the Restrictions on
Business Corporations and Unions Intact, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 11,
2009; Kausfiles Blog, http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/kausfiles (June 30, 2009,
19:17 EDT); see also Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appellant at 18-19, Citizens United, No. 08-205 (U.S. July
31, 2009) (urging the Court, in the alternative, to expand the MCFL exception if
the Court does not overrule Austin entirely).
110. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 3-5, Citizens United, No. 08-205
(U.S. July 24, 2009); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing
the questions presented by Citizens United).
111. See Richard L. Hasen, Free Speech v. Campaign Finance Laws: The
Reargument, 36 PREVIEW U. S. SuP. CT. CAS. 472 (2009) (making this point).
112. This conclusion is based on the assumption that unless otherwise
stated in the Rules of the Supreme Court, consent of a majority of the Court is
needed to issue orders. There is, however, apparently a confidential internal
handbook of procedures that could provide a different rule. See David C.
Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views
of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 272-73 (2009) (stating that
the number of votes at conference required to call for the views of the Solicitor
General is reportedly listed in this handbook, and public reports state that only
four or possibly three votes are required).
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
of McConnell directly. With respect to these two topics, we have
strong evidence regarding the views of most, but not all, of the
Justices. Three Justices-Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer-
continue to agree with the reasoning of Austin and that the
existing limitations on corporate spending are constitutional.113
Three other Justices-Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-have flatly
and repeatedly stated that the Court incorrectly decided both
Austin and the relevant portion McConnell.114 Unless one or
more of these Justices change their views, the views of the three
most recently appointed Justices will likely decide this case.
Starting with Chief Justice Roberts, in WRTL he discussed
the rationales that supported the conclusions in Austin and
McConnell relating to corporate funding of express advocacy and
the functional equivalent of express advocacy, but appeared only
to accept those rationales as a given while refusing to extend
them to communications that fall outside of these categories
because such communications could be reasonably interpreted as
having a purpose other than to influence the election of the
identified candidate.115 He also carefully noted in WRTL that the
113. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2781 (2008)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Austin with approval) (joined by Souter, J.,
Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.); WRTL, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2689 (2007)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Austin with approval) (joined by Stevens, J.,
Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.); id. at 2692 (distinguishing Austin from Bellotti);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) (opinion by Stevens, J. and
O'Connor, J.) (citing Austin with approval and in support of finding BCRA § 203
constitutional on its face) (joined by Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.);
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
114. WRTL, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. at 2679 ("Austin was a significant
departure from ancient First Amendment principles. In my view, it was
wrongly decided."); id. at 2684. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Today's cases make it
apparent... that McConnell's holding concerning § 203 was wrong.") (joined by
Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 273-75 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing BCRA § 203 is
unconstitutional and that "I would overturn Austin") (joined by Scalia, J.); id. at
323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing BCRA
§ 203 is unconstitutional and stating "[i]nstead of extending Austin ... I would
overrule it") (joined by Scalia, J.); Austin, 494 U.S. at 695-713 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (joined by O'Connor, J. and Scalia, j.).
115. WRTL, 551 U.S ... 127 S. Ct. at 2071-74.
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Court had "no occasion to revisit" the McConnell holding.116
Similarly, Justice Alito, while also being careful not to speak
directly to the correctness of Austin or McConnell, raised in his
WRTL concurrence the possibility that even the relatively
narrow definition of electioneering communications established
in that case might "impermissibly chill[] political speech" which
would lead to the Court "presumably be[ing] asked in a future
case to reconsider the holding in [McConnell] that [BCRA] § 203
is facially constitutional."'17 Justice Alito further stated, in the
opinion for the Court in the Davis "millionaire's amendment"
case joined by Chief Justice Roberts, that providing "level
electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal
wealth" and reducing "the natural advantage that wealthy
individuals possess in campaigns for federal office" are not
legitimate government objectives, much less ones sufficiently
important to justify restricting speech.118 The care taken to avoid
commenting on the correctness of the Austin and McConnell
decisions, combined with the skepticism of Justice Alito's opinion
in Davis about reducing wealth-driven inequalities in politics
being even a legitimate government interest, suggest that both
these members of the Court would be skeptical of claims based
upon the reasoning in Austin and the portion of McConnell
addressing BCRA § 203.
The position of Justice Sotomayor is less clear. She, not
surprisingly, refused to address specific campaign finance issues,
particularly relating to the Citizens United case, during her
recent confirmation hearings.119 As a judge, she was involved in
relatively few election law cases, only one of which squarely
involved campaign finance issues, and in that case only as one of
116. Id. at 2674.
117. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
118. Davis, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2773.
119. See, e.g., The Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com2009/07/15/
us/politics/15confi rm-text.html (follow "Russ Feingold" hyperlink) (exchange
with Senator Russ Feingold in which Judge Sotomayor declined to answer
questions about the Citizens United case).
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many judges voting to refuse en banc consideration.120 While the
effect of that vote was to leave in place Vermont's relatively strict
campaign finance law limitations-limitations the Supreme
Court ultimately ruled were unconstitutional infringements on
speech121-it would be unwise to read too much into what was on
its face a procedural, not a substantive, vote.122 Judge Sotomayor
also served on the New York City Campaign Finance Board from
1988 through 1992, but since the opinions issued by that body
were both highly dependent on local law and, for the most part,
issued by the Board as a whole, little can be drawn from the
Board's materials.123 Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence
is her questioning of whether the amount of private money in
election campaigns is unduly influencing elected officials in a
speech later published in a law review, but even that statement
is from more than a dozen years ago and was a small part of a
much broader discussion.124 So while it appears, as most
observers predict, that she will in general be to the "center-left"
when it comes to election law issues, i.e., not necessarily
dissimilar from now retired Justice Souter, that prediction is in
120. See Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org (May 27, 2009, 22:05
PDT) (analyzing these cases).
121. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
122. See Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 165-67 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sack, J.
and Katzmann, J., concurring in decision to deny rehearing en banc) (stating
the issue is not whether the panel majority or the dissent was right but whether
the decision was of "exceptional importance" that justified the extraordinary
step of an en banc rehearing, and whether such a rehearing would be a
significant aid to the Supreme Court in the event it decided to consider the case)
(joined by Sotomayor, J. and Parker, J.).
123. At least some commentators have tried with mixed results. Compare
Charlie Savage, A Long Record on Campaign Finance, Often in Support of
Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2009, at A8 (analyzing her views on campaign
finance laws and attempting to draw conclusions from the limited public
information about her role on the Board), and Posting of Kenneth P. Vogel to
POLITICO, http://dyn.politico.com (May 28, 2009, 19:40 EDT) (same in post
titled "Sotomayor no fan of campaign cash"), with Posting of Charlie Savage to
The Caucus, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com (July 13, 2009, 21:15 EDT)
(based on additional materials from the Board, noting that Sotomayor defended
an interpretation of the law based on its plain meaning even in the face of
objections that it would undermine campaign spending limits).
124. See Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law
and Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 42 (1996).
many ways an educated guess.125
So that leaves the Court with three Austin and McConnell
supporters, three Austin and McConnell opponents, one possible
additional supporter, and two probable additional opponents.
Does this necessarily mean that both Austin and the relevant
portion of McConnell are doomed? The answer to that question
depends on whether one of the probable opponents, who have not
as of yet flatly stated they would overrule Austin or McConnell,
can be convinced there is a valid rationale for supporting the
continued validity of those cases. There are several candidates
for such a rationale, but the most persuasive for the probable
opponents is ironically at risk of being undermined by some
Austin and McConnell supporters: the doctrine of stare decisis.
But first I will consider the other rationales.
C. Grounds for Upholding Austin and McConnell
The most obvious candidate, but also probably the least
convincing one for the probable opponents, is the non-distortion
theory asserted in Austin and relied upon in McConnell.126 Both
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have been careful not to
directly criticize this theory, but both have limited its application
and given other indications that they do not favor it.127 In
WRTL, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito,
acknowledged this theory but refused to apply it to
communications that were not considered either express
advocacy or the functional equivalent of express advocacy under
125. See supra notes 120 & 123.
126. See supra notes 59, 80 and accompanying text.
127. In contrast, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer have not only
endorsed it but indicated support for its extension. See supra note 113; Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2781 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no
reason that ... concerns about the corrosive and distorting effects of wealth on
our political process . . . is not equally applicable in the context of individual
wealth.") (joined by Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.) (2007); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing the
goal of "democratiz[ing] the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon
the electoral process" as justifying contribution limits that infringed on speech)
(joined by Ginsburg, J.) (2000).
20091 Breaching a Leaking Dam ?
that decision's relatively narrow definition of the latter term.128
Similarly, Justice Alito, writing for the Court in Davis, refused to
accept equalization of financial influence as a legitimate, much
less compelling, governmental interest, citing Justice Kennedy's
dissent in Austin as supporting that conclusion.129 Moreover,
both Justices also appear favorably inclined to the view that
"corruption" for these purposes refers only to a quid pro quo
arrangement, which is certainly the view of Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas.130 In the Davis opinion joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Alito cited with approval the earlier
statement of Justice Thomas that "[p]reventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling
government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances."131 Finally, Justice Alito has indicated a reluctance to
permit relatively vague governmental interests to be the grounds
for infringing on speech even in the special context of public
schools.132 Likely for some or all of these reasons, the
Government has chosen not to rely on the non-distortion theory
in its supplemental brief but to instead argue that corporate
spending on election-related communications in fact creates a
significant risk of actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption. 133
The problem with the quid pro quo corruption approach is
that it requires accepting the proposition that even truly
independent activity-assuming that the new coordination rules
enacted in the wake of BCRA in fact ensure that such activity is
128. FEC v. WRTL, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672-73 (2007).
129. Davis, 554 U.S. at__, 128 S. Ct. at 2773.
130. See WRTL, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. at 2671-72 (principal opinion)
(characterizing this interest as "the quid-pro-quo corruption interest"); id. at
2676 (Scalia, J., concurring) (taking the position that the corruption referred to
in Buckley "was of the 'quid pro quo' variety, whereby an individual or entity
makes a contribution or expenditure in exchange for some action by an official")
(joined by Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.).
131. Davis, 554 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
132. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S ... 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636-37 (2007)
(Alito, J., concurring).
133. Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, supra note 110, at 8-12; see also
Supplemental Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-
205 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2009) (highlighting this aspect of the Government's brief).
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not coordinated in any way with candidates or political
parties 134-raises a sufficient risk of actual or perceived quid pro
quo arrangements. This is an argument that appears only to
have been explicitly agreed to by one Justice to date, Justice
Stevens.135 There is, however, some evidence of such a risk in the
legislative history of BCRA, at least with respect to corporate
independent activities.136 The certain opponents implicitly
rejected the sufficiency of this evidence, however, when they
dissented in McConnell, and there is no indication that the
probable opponents will be more open to it.137 The Government
recognizes this concern in its brief by suggesting that if the Court
finds that previously gathered evidence insufficient, the proper
resolution is a remand to the district court for discovery on this
point. 138 Such a result seems unlikely, however, given the
apparent interest of a majority of the Court in resolving these
constitutional issues now (i.e., before the start of the next federal
election primary season), as indicated by the scheduling of re-
argument for September 9, 2009, before the usual October start
date for the Supreme Court's Term.139
The quid pro quo approach also, like the non-distortion
approach in Austin, requires that the Court be willing to
distinguish between individual speakers-whom Buckley held
Congress could not limit even with respect to their independent
134. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
135. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)
(stating that independent expenditures are significantly less likely than
contributions to be provided as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from a
candidate); Supplemental Reply Brief for the Appellee 8-9, Citizens United, No.
08-205 (U.S. Aug. 2009) (arguing this statement from Buckley does not apply to
"modern business corporations").
136. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555-60, 622-24 (D.D.C.
2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reviewing
this legislative history), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
137. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 273-75 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, supra note 110, at 11-12.
139. See Order in Pending Case, supra note 7 (scheduling reargument for
Sept. 9, 2009).
Breaching a Leaking Dam?
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW
expenditures for express advocacy14O-and corporate speakers.
In other words, as Richard Pildes has commented, perhaps the
way to resolve this case is to reject applying to the candidate-
election context Bellotti's conclusion that the identity of the
speaker is irrelevant.141 Pildes notes that existing law already
makes this distinction in another way: foreign nationals who are
not permanent residents cannot make contributions to
candidates or fund their own independent expenditures.142 While
these restrictions on foreign nationals have not been subject to
constitutional challenge, if it is assumed they would be upheld
the most likely rationale for doing so would be that the identity of
the speaker does matter for constitutional purposes in the
candidate-election context, even if it does not in Bellotti's ballot
initiative election context. 43  If that is the case, then it is
plausible to at least consider whether the fact that the speaker is
an individual or a corporation should also matter, given the
different characteristics inherent in these two types of entities.144
In Austin, the Court found that the legal advantages
corporations enjoy-"limited liability, perpetual life, and
favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets"-give corporations a political advantage over individuals,
particularly since the accumulation of wealth aided by these
advantages is "not an indication of popular support for the
corporation's political idea."45 In the Court's view, it was this
140. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Despite the skepticism of
perhaps a majority of the Court toward the Buckley contribution-expenditure
divide, see supra note 36, Buckley's continued viability is not at issue in Citizens
United.
141. See Posting of Rick Pildes to Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.o
rg/archives/2009_07.html (July 8, 2009, 8:25 PDT) (guest post by Rick Pildes,
cited with permission).
142. Id.; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006).
143. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441e (West 2009), Notes of Decisions (not listing any
constitutional challenges to the prohibition on campaign contributions and
independent expenditures by non-resident foreign nationals).
144. See infra notes 145-46, 154 and accompanying text; supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
145. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990) (citation omitted). For a discussion of the more fundamental views of
corporations that are arguably implicit in the positions of the various Justices
in Bellotti and Austin, see Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under
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aspect of corporations that lead to the risk of "a different type of
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth," the prevention of
which provides a sufficiently important governmental interest to
justify the prohibition on corporate independent expenditures.146
It could similarly be argued the same distinctive, corporate
characteristics create a risk of quid pro quo corruption or
appearance of such corruption that does not exist with
individuals who pay for express advocacy or its functional
equivalent. While it would be hyperbole to say all for-profit
corporations share this risk-there are, of course, many
unsuccessful corporations-it is a plausible argument that the
tendency for such corruption or at least the appearance of such
corruption is significantly greater for corporations as compared to
for individuals generally. As for nonprofit corporations that
likely do not share these for-profit corporation characteristics,
the Court has already exempted some of them in the MCFL case
and could,. as some have urged, expand that exemption at least
for nonprofit corporations that create little risk of serving as
conduits for for-profit corporation spending.147
If the Court were writing on a blank slate, this is a
potentially convincing rationale that might sway one or both of
the probable opponents. Any hope Austin supporters might have
for this result is foreclosed, however, by the continued vitality of
Bellotti. Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito seems
inclined to question Bellotti. In WRTL, Roberts stated
"[a]ccepting the notion that a ban on campaign speech could also
embrace issue advocacy would call into question our holding in
Bellotti that the corporate identity of a speaker does not strip
corporations of all free speech rights."148 And in Davis, Justice
Alito cited Bellotti favorably with respect to its statements
the First Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 362 (1991).
For the sake of brevity, this Article does not discuss the related but separate
issue of the exception for news stories and other media communications,
including such communications paid for by media corporations. See 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
146. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
147. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
148. WRTL, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2007).
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holding that the government generally cannot choose what
speakers are permissible and what speakers are not.1 49
It is true that the Court in Bellotti carefully noted that its
decision did not reach the prohibition on both corporate
campaign contributions and corporate independent expenditures
also contained in the statute at issue but not challenged by the
appellants.150 The Court's basis for distinguishing that
prohibition was, however, merely that
our consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of
general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite
different context of participation in a political campaign for
election to public office. Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent
corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to
influence candidate elections. 151
For reasons already discussed, the evidence Congress has
been able to muster is unlikely to be persuasive to a majority of
the Court, nor is that majority likely to be open to waiting on the
accumulation of more such evidence.152
While it could also be argued-and the Government does in
fact argue153--that investors in for-profit corporations do not, at
least usually, invest because of the political stands of a for-profit
corporation and so are at risk of having their funds "hijacked" for
a political activity not of their choosing, the Court in Bellotti
149. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773-74 (2008).
150. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787-88 & n.26 (1978). But
see JAMIN B. RAsKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 185-88 (2003) (supporting limits on corporate spending with
respect to elections but concluding that Bellotti is probably inconsistent with
such limits even for candidate elections).
151. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (citations omitted).
152. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text; WRTL, 551 U.S.
127 S. Ct. at 2678 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting reliance on this footnote
in Bellotti by stating "[n]o one seriously believes that independent expenditures
could possibly give rise to quid-pro-quo corruption without being subject to
regulation as coordinated expenditures"). It appears, however, that Justice
Stevens does seriously believe exactly this. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Supplemental Reply Brief for the Appellee, supra note 135, at 7-8;
Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, supra note 110, at 12-13.
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rejected such concerns because it found the prohibition at issue
in that case both under- and over-protected shareholders.154 The
same criticism applies to the prohibitions at issue in the current
case: many potentially objectionable political expenditures are
not covered by the prohibitions-e.g., communications that are
the functional equivalent of express advocacy but are not covered
by BCRA § 203 because they are made through media other than
broadcast, cable, or satellite communications-while a
corporation with politically united shareholders who authorized
the corporate electioneering communication or express advocacy
would still be prohibited from paying for such communications.155
Finally as noted previously, the different treatment of foreign
nationals who are not permanent residents has never been tested
in court (and may be constitutionally permitted for reasons that
are not applicable to corporations even if it were so tested), and
the sole dissenter from Bellotti's reasoning that the identity of
the speaker is irrelevant appears to have later abandoned that
view (and is no longer on the Court).156 And unlike Austin, none
of the current Justices appears to have ever questioned the
reasoning of Bellotti, only whether that reasoning applies in the
candidate-election context. 157 For all of these reasons, therefore,
it appears unlikely that this argument will win the day.
Is there another rationale that has not yet been considered
by the Court for distinguishing corporations from individuals
that could support the holdings if not the reasoning in McConnell
154. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793-94. But see FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,
154 (2003) (citing this reason as supporting the ban on corporate campaign
contributions).
155. This reasoning parallels the reasoning provided in Bellotti.
156. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; supra notes 142-43.
157. See, e.g., WRTL, 551 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2673; see also Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773-74 (2008) (showing instances where
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito cited Bellotti favorably); WRTL, 551
U.S. __ 128 S. Ct. at 2677 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bellotti favorably); id.
at 2692 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Bellotti from Austin on the
grounds that Austin applied to the candidate-election, but not suggesting that
the Court wrongly decided Bellotti). Some scholars have, however, asserted
that Bellotti is out-of-line with both the First Amendment and the Court's
previous cases and so should be overruled. See, e.g., RASKIN, supra note 150, at
186-94; Adam Winkler, McConnell v. FEC, Corporate Political Speech, and the
Legacy of the Segregated Fund Cases, 3 ELECTION L.J. 361 (2004).
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and Austin? It could be argued that another ground for making
this distinction is that, unlike individuals, corporations are not
voters and so have no inherent right to influence elections. The
main problems with this argument are that it both runs contrary
to the holding in Bellotti given that corporations have no more
right to vote for ballot initiatives than for candidates. It thus
appears unlikely that this voter-based argument would be
persuasive to a majority of the Court.
Even if, as it appears likely, there are five Justices who reject
the non-distortion rationale for treating corporate speakers
differently from individual speakers, the Government's quid pro
quo corruption rationale for doing the same, and other grounds
for treating corporate speakers differently from individual
speakers, there is one remaining argument for at least leaving
Austin, however. That rationale is the doctrine of stare decisis.
D. Stare Decisis
Stated briefly, the doctrine of stare decisis provides that
courts should follow their own, previous decisions unless there
are sufficient reasons to do otherwise.158 Reasons for the doctrine
include that it "promotes the even-handed, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process."159 Relevant considerations
include not only the correctness of the previous case's reasoning,
but its age, the reliance interests at stake, and the workability of
the decision in practice.160 Other valid considerations include
whether there has been an important change in circumstances,
whether the decision has been undermined by later decisions,
and whether constitutional issues are at stake.161 Applying the
158. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)
(declining to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), stating that
even when constitutional rights are at issue a departure from precedent
requires some "special justification" (citation omitted)).
159. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 (2006) (citations omitted)
(2006).
160. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S __, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088-89 (2009).
161. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1728 (2009) (Alito,
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doctrine can be difficult, however, because, perhaps not
surprisingly, not only do the Justices often disagree over the
strength of the underlying facts relating to each of these
considerations in a given case but also with respect to the
relative weight to be accorded each of the considerations.162
Furthermore, none of the three certain opponents is likely to be
swayed by a stare decisis argument given each has already
clearly taken the position that Austin and the relevant portion of
McConnell should be overruled.163
That said, there is reason to believe that at least Justice Alito
could be swayed by a stare decisis argument. In a recent search
and seizure case, Justice Alito wrote an extensive dissent chiding
the majority for failing to respect past precedent and carefully
walking through the relevant factors for applying stare decisis.164
He also criticized some of his colleagues for their alleged selective
use of stare decisis when they chose to rely on it in a later case
(involving criminal procedure) even though they had rejected its
application in the earlier search and seizure case.165 At the same
time, he criticized Justice Scalia's "narrow view" of stare decisis
in the earlier case. 166  That view was essentially that bad
reasoning leading to incorrect results is by itself sufficient
grounds for overruling precedent.167 Assuming, as these opinions
J., dissenting).
162. For the most recent examples of sharp disagreements between the
Justices regarding the applicability of stare decisis, see the various opinions in
Montejo, 556 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 2079, and Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1710.
163. Supra note 114; see also WRTL, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2685-86
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that stare decisis considerations are
not sufficient to justify leaving McConnell's holding with respect to BCRA § 203
in place) (joined by Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.).
164. Gant, 556 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. at 1726-32 (Alito, J., dissenting).
165. Montejo, 556 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. at 2093-94 (Alito, J., concurring).
Justice Alito's position in this case appears to be that contrary to the dissent's
assertions, the Court did in fact correctly determine that stare decisis should
not control. See id. at 2088-91 (majority opinion) (explaining why stare decisis
does not require upholding the precedent under discussion) (joined by Alito, J.).
166. Id. at 2093.
167. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating
in the face of Justice Alito's appeal to stare decisis, stating that there is "ample
reason" to abandon prior precedent when "the precedent was badly reasoned
and produces erroneous (in this case unconstitutional) results"); see also Morse
v. Frederick, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2634-36 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
20091
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW
indicate, that Justice Alito is likely to give serious consideration
to stare decisis and not likely to accept the position that poor
reasoning is by itself sufficient grounds to overrule a precedent,
the question is then whether application of that doctrine will
garner his critical fifth vote to uphold either Austin or
McConnell.168
With respect to overturning Austin, four factors militate
towards upholding it: (1) the age of Austin and the law it
supports, which is traceable back over 60 years; (2) the fact that
political political actors have adjusted their behavior due to the
law in Austin;169 (3) the fact that Bellotti, which seemingly cuts
against Austin, was decided prior to Austin and therefore does
not impact Austin's authority; and (4) the fact that there have
been no changes in the relevant circumstances that would
warrant a review of Austin's justification even if one believes its
reasoning is correct (as Justice Alito likely does,70). The other
commonly considered stare decisis factor is reliance, and it is less
clear how that factor cuts. It could be argued that given the ever-
changing political (and indeed campaign finance law) landscape
election-participants and corporations could easily adjust their
activities in the next round of elections to reflect an overruling of
Austin. It could and in fact has been argued, however, that not
only have election-participants made plans based on the
continued viability of Austin but both Congress and the state
legislatures that have enacted bans on corporate funding of
independent expenditures have structured their campaign
finance laws at least in part in reliance on Austin being good
concurring) (appearing to suggest that the longstanding student free speech
precedent of Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
should be overruled simply because it is wrong).
168. Assuming Justice Sotomayor votes to uphold these decisions, as seems
likely. See supra note 120, 123 and accompanying text. Such serious
consideration does not, of course, guarantee that precedent will be upheld. See,
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816-18 (2009) (Justice
Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, concluding after consideration of stare
decisis that a precedent should be overruled because of a lack of reliance,
inconsistent application by the lower courts, and repeated criticism from
members of the Court.).
169. See infra note 175.
170. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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law.171 Given this at least modest amount of reliance, as well as
the other considerations already cited, there therefore appears to
be a reasonably strong argument for upholding Austin on stare
decisis grounds.
As Ned Foley has pointed out, however, the application of the
doctrine to defend Austin is complicated not only by the fact that
a constitutional interpretation is at issue-which tends to
weaken the case for observing stare decisis172-but also by the
fact that unlike many other Supreme Court precedents that
affect only a relatively narrow range of activities, campaign
finance precedents such as Austin potentially implicate the very
functioning of our democratic system. 173 The constitutional harm
from leaving an erroneous Austin decision in place is therefore,
at least potentially, substantial in way that leaving other
erroneous precedents in place may not be.174 But there are
strong reasons to conclude that potential has not been realized.
First, it is important to remember that the existing
prohibition on corporate funding of independent expenditures
and electioneering communications only reaches a relatively
narrow range of election-related activities (although the potential
amount of affected speech may be large in an absolute sense). As
Congress documented while considering BCRA, many apparently
effective election-related communications are not considered
express advocacy and so, prior to BCRA, could still be funded by
corporations.175 While BCRA forbids corporate (and union)
171. Several of the amicus curaie briefs supporting Austin make similar
points. See, e.g., Brief of Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae at 19-
22, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (U.S. July 31, 2009); Supplemental Brief
of Senator John McCain, supra note 25, at 4-7,; Brief of the States of Montana,
et al. at 5-13, Citizens United, No. 08-205 (U.S. July 31, 2009). But see Suppl.
Brief of Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae at 17-20, Citizens United, No. 08-205
(U.S. July 31, 2009) (arguing against the application of stare decisis).
172. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
173. See Edward B. Foley, Citizens United, Stare Decisis, and Democracy,
FREE & FAIR, July 31, 2009, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/art
icles.php?ID=6631.
174. Some might disagree with Foley's use of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), as one example of upholding precedent that only relates to
a narrow field of social policy. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst
Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).
175. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 526-32 (D.D.C. 2003)
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funding of some of those communications, it only reached certain
specific broadcast, cable, and satellite communications, not
communications through other media, and not communications
outside of the relevant time windows.176 And the reach of BCRA
was further limited by the WRTL decision.77 Therefore, there
appears to still be a relatively broad range of election-related
communications that corporations can, and in fact have, funded
even with the Austin- and McConnell-backed prohibitions in
place.
Some of the supporters of Austin, however, risk undermining
this argument by predicting an electoral meltdown if the Court
overrules Austin. For example, various amici curiae predict that
"[o]verturning Austin [w]ould [r]adically [a]lter [h]ow [e]lections
[a]re [c]onducted and [f]inanced,"178 "will dramatically alter the
campaign finance landscape,"179 and will "transform the conduct
of elections in this country."180 If I am correct that the stare
decisis argument is the most likely one to garner a fifth vote to
uphold Austin given that a majority of the Court probably
believes Austin was wrongly decided, such statements only serve
to make a case for how big an effect Austin had on speech and so
on First Amendment rights. Such "sky is falling" statements also
appear to be wrong, for reasons described in Part V below based
on both the pre-BCRA environment and the situation in states
which do not prohibit corporate-funded independent
(reviewing this legislative history) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
176. See supra notes 74, 76 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
178. Brief of Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 171,
at 6; see also id. at 7 (comparing the total net worth of U.S corporations and
their total annual profits to the amount of campaign funds raised by the
Democratic presidential nominee, implying that a substantial portion of the
former amounts would find their way into the electoral process if the Court
overruled Austin).
179. Supplemental Brief of the Center for Political Accountability et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 4, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205
(U.S. July 30, 2009); see also id. at 8 (citing ExxonMobil's profits).
180. Supplemental Brief of Representatives Chris Van Hollen et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 3, Citizens United, No. 08-205 (U.S. July
31, 2009).
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expenditures.181 If these statements are in fact wrong, that fact
provides further support for the application of stare decisis to
preserve Austin even if, as a majority Court seems likely to
conclude, it was wrongly decided.
The stare decisis argument is less compelling with respect to
the relevant portion of McConnell, however. Both the decision
itself and BCRA § 203 have only been in place for three federal
election cycles, and the Court has already significantly limited
the effect reach of this portion of McConnell in the subsequent
WRTL decision.182 Furthermore, there are arguably significant
questions regarding the workability of the WRTL-adopted
definition of electioneering communications in the minds of at
least several of the Justices including, most critically, Justice
Alito.183 So even though the constitutional harm caused by
leaving McConnell, and therefore § 203, in place is probably
relatively minimal, it appears likely that if a majority of the
Court believes the Court incorrectly decided this part of
McConnell, the doctrine of stare decisis will not provide much
support for nevertheless leaving that holding intact.
E. Conclusion
If, however, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
reject this stare decisis argument, then it appears likely that a
181. See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
183. In his WRTL concurrence, Justice Alito suggested he might be willing
to revisit McConnell if the WRTL standard could be shown to "impermissibly
chill[] political speech." WRTL, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2007) (Alito,
J., concurring); see also id. at 2679-84 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the
WRTL standard and indeed any definition of "functional equivalent of express
advocacy" is unworkable). For this reason, if a majority of the Court concludes
that the Court wrongly decided McConnell with respect to BCRA § 203, it is
also highly unlikely to uphold that statute based on a "backup" definition for
electioneering communications provided by Congress that in fact is very similar
to the WRTL definition except it lacks the time limits contained in the primary
definition. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(ii) (2006) ("If clause (i) is held to be
constitutionally insufficient . . . then the term 'electioneering communication'
means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or
supports a candidate... or attacks or opposes a candidate ... and which also is
suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or
against a specific candidate.").
majority of the Court will choose to reject either or both of the
cited precedents.184 Rejection of only the McConnell holding
relating to corporate funding of electioneering communications is
all that is necessary to resolve the issue of whether Citizens
United can distribute the movie through video on-demand, and
the careful attempts by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to
avoid explicitly overruling precedents in the campaign finance
area would suggest that a limited overruling may be more likely
if-and this is a big if-they continue to follow this approach.185
The fact that they presumably supported the re-argument and
supplemental briefing on these precedents does not necessarily
mean that they will completely abandon this approach by
supporting the overruling of Austin as well, as it may simply be
that the narrow, technical ways of resolving this case implicitly
rejected by the Court were not attractive particularly after the
March 2009 oral argument.1 s6 Such a result also does not
necessarily require defending Austin or the distinction between
express advocacy and the functional equivalent of express
advocacy, since only the later is at issue in this case. Rather, the
Court could simply leave re-visiting Austin for another day,
although almost certainly over the objections of Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas.187 It is certainly possible, however, that
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will join the three certain
opponents in abandoning this cautious approach to overrule
Austin as well. The next part considers the possible
ramifications if the Court does in fact overrule one or both of
these precedents.
184. Nothing in the oral re-argument of the case, held on September 9,
2009, would indicate a different conclusion; in fact, neither Chief Justice
Roberts nor Justice Alito gave any indication they would be particularly open to
a stare decisis argument.
185. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
186. To be fair to the government's attorney, the statements at oral
argument were consistent with statements in its brief regarding the
constitutional scope of Congress' authority in this area. See Brief for the
Appellee, at 14-16, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2009).
187. See WRTL, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. at 2678-79 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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V. RAMIFICATIONS IF THE COURT OVERRULES
MCCONNELL (IN PART) OR AUSTIN
If the Court overrules only the relevant part of McConnell, it
is not clear that it will have a significant effect on elections given
the Court's earlier WRTL decision that significantly limited the
reach of BCRA § 203.188 Such a decision would also likely leave
BCRA's electioneering communication disclaimer and disclosure
provisions unscathed for reasons discussed below.189
Furthermore, a decision that only overruled McConnell but
stopped short of overruling Austin might signal an end to the
current Court's revisiting of constitutional decisions relating to
campaign finance, thereby leaving the bulk of federal (and state)
election law intact, although it also might only be a way station
on the road to further limitations on Congress's authority in this
area. 190
Overruling Austin would have a far greater immediate effect,
as not only would it have the effect of overruling McConnell with
respect to BCRA § 203, but it would free corporations (and likely
unions) to make unlimited independent expenditures. I argue
below, however, that the impact on elections would not be as
dramatic as some have asserted, as it is far from clear how much
new corporate (and likely union) spending would result as
opposed to simply shifting such spending from currently
unregulated, election-related activity.191 More significantly,
such a step could foreshadow even more dramatic decisions with
respect to campaign finance laws relating to both limitations on
contributions to political committees engaged in independent
expenditures and with respect to corporate contributions to both
political parties and candidates' campaigns. Such further steps
are not inevitable, however. Third and finally, overruling Austin
would likely place substantial pressure on a separate body of law:
the federal tax rules governing the political activities of tax-
188. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
190. See Hasen, supra note 84, at 1066-67 (predicting that the current
Court will be favorably disposed to numerous campaign finance law challenges).
191. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
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exempt organizations-the vast majority of which are nonprofit
corporations-particularly if the Court also strikes down the
disclosure provisions currently applicable to independent
expenditures and electioneering communications.
A. Ramifications for Elections
If the Court only overrules the part of McConnell relating to
BCRA § 203, it will return campaign finance laws for
independent activities to their pre-BCRA state. That will
presumably mean a return to at least the volume of election-
related communications that stopped short of express advocacy
which existed prior to BCRA. The amount of spending on
communications reached by BCRA even pre-WRTL was probably
in the neighborhood of $100 million per two-year election cycle,
based on spending on political advertising by groups acting
independently of candidates and political parties.92 That figure
compares to total contributions in each of the 2000 and 2002
federal election cycles reported to the FEC, not including soft
money contributions to political parties or permitted
contributions for independent expenditures of over a billion
dollars.193 And presumably at least some of those funds have
been spent in other ways even after BCRA, such as on election-
192. See David B. Magleby & J. Quin Monson, The Last Hurrah?: Soft
Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections, in THE LAST
HURRAH?: SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE ADVoCACY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTION 1, 2-3 (David B. Magleby & J. Quin Monson, eds., 2003), available
at http://csed.byu.edu/Assets/Pew/2002%2OMonograph.pdf (describing issue
advocacy, i.e. non-express advocacy, in the last federal election before BCRA
that appeared to be at or slightly above the levels during the 2000
election); Craig B. Holman & Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying Time 2000:
Television Advertising in the 2000 Federal Elections: Executive Summary 13
(2001), available at http:/Ibrennan.3cdn.net/efd37f4l7fl6ee6341_4dm6iid9c.pdf
(reporting television spending by special interest groups, which would
presumably include both permitted independent expenditures by MCFL
corporations and advertising outside of the BCRA time windows as well as
BCRA-covered electioneering communications, at just under $100 million).
193. See FED. ELECTION COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, 50-51, 55 (2003)
(reporting candidate and political party "hard money" receipts for the 2002
election cycle); FED. ELECTION COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, 58, 62, 65-66
(2001) (reporting candidate and political party "hard money" receipts for the
2000 election cycle).
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related communications that used avenues other than broadcast,
cable, or satellite or avoided the BCRA time windows.194 So
while a determination by the Court that McConnell was incorrect
in that BCRA § 203 is unconstitutional will widen the already
existing cracks in the corporate spending dam, it will do so only
marginally.
If, on the other hand, the Court overrules Austin then a
broader range of communications will now be fundable with
corporate-and presumably union-moneys.195 It is unrealistic,
however, to expect that ExxonMobil or GE or Microsoft, or for-
profit corporations collectively, will suddenly start pumping
billions of dollars into election-related ads in this situation. Even
when corporate funding of election-related activities was subject
to much fewer restrictions, business corporations did not
demonstrate anywhere near this level of spending. As already
noted, pre-BCRA levels of independent spending that was not for
express advocacy-and so not prohibited-were significant but
still relatively modest compared to overall spending.196
Furthermore, even under current law, corporations can both
inform the public, in a limited way, that they have endorsed a
particular candidate and communicate freely about that
endorsement with their shareholders and senior employees, but
the vast majority of corporations appear not to have taken
advantage of this freedom.197 Perhaps most telling is the evidence
194. See Robert G. Boatright et al., Interest Groups and Advocacy
Organizations After BCRA, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS,
AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 112, 113-14 (Michael J. Malbin ed.,
2006) (concluding that BCRA's electioneering communication rules had
"marginal effects" on interest group advertising in 2004 because many groups
shifted their ads to before the BCRA 60-day general election time windows and
also to voter mobilization as opposed to television ads).
195. If the Court concludes that the First Amendment prohibits limits on
corporate independent expenditures, thereby rejecting the various rationales
previously discussed, it is difficult to see how it could reach a different
conclusion with respect to unions. See supra Part II.C; see also Austin v. Mich.
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-66 (1990) (upholding
Michigan's decision to bar independent expenditures by corporations but not
unions by concluding that unions do not have all of the characteristics of
corporations that raise distortion concerns).
196. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
197. See FEC, supra note 63, at 87-88.
20091 Breaching a Leaking Dam?
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW rVolume 4
of corporate independent expenditure relating to state and local
elections in states that do not prohibit such spending.198
A 2008 report by the California Fair Political Practices
Commission (FPPC), provocatively titled Independent
Expenditures: The Giant Gorilla in Campaign Finance, found
that from 2001 through 2006, or during three election cycles,
total independent expenditures were $88 million.199 It should be
noted that approximately ten percent of this figure included
spending traceable to individuals, as opposed to corporations,
unions, or other entities.200 Assuming this report's figures are
accurate-and its title certainly suggests a bias toward, if
anything, inflating these figures-this spending pales in
comparison to the over $750 million dollars raised by state and
legislative candidates during the same three election cycles.201
So even in the most populous state, with unlimited corporate and
union funding of independent expenditures permitted, such
expenditures do not dominate the campaign finance landscape.
The data that is readily available from other states indicates
similar patterns; independent expenditures (some of which may
198. See supra note 25. There do not appear to be any studies regarding
whether corporate and union funded independent expenditures result in
increased corruption at the state and local level or change public perceptions of
government, although there is at least one study testing whether there was a
correlation between views of government and some common campaign finance
laws (public disclosure of campaign contributions, limits on contributions by
organizations, limits on contributions by organizations and individuals, public
subsidies to candidates that abide by expenditure limits, and mandatory
expenditures limits (pre-Buckley)); it found at most a minor correlation for some
but not all of the laws. See David M. Primo & Jeff Milyo, Campaign Finance
and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States, 5 ELECTION L.J. 23, 34-35
(2006).
199. CAL. FAIR POL. PRACTICES COMM'N (FPPC), INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES:
THE GIANT GORILLA IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 3 (2008), available at http://www.fppc.
ca.gov/ie/IEReport2.pdf.
200. Id. at 22.
201. FPPC, THE BILLION DOLLAR MONEY TRAIN: FUNDRAISING BY CANDIDATES
FOR STATE OFFICE SINCE VOTERS ENACTED CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 34 (2009),
available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/reports/billiondollar-money-train.pdf. The
billion dollars referred to in the title is the total amount raised during the past
four election cycles (2001 through 2008). Id. at 3. The report also states that
there were $110 million in independent expenditures during those four election
cycles, but does not provide information regarding how much of such
expenditures can be traced back to individuals. Id. at 24.
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originate with individual donors) are generally much less than
candidate contributions.202 That said, it is true that careful
targeting of such expenditures can lead to them representing a
significant proportion of the spending in a given race. 203 But the
reality appears to be there is less water behind the already
leaking corporate (and union) independent expenditure dam than
some suggest.204
There are a number of likely reasons for these limited
contributions: the ever increasing but still limited amount of
money that can be spent effectively during the election season,
the negative ramifications for both a business corporation and
the candidates it would like to see elected if it is perceived as
having "bought" the election, and so on. (For the reasons detailed
in the next section, the disclaimer and disclosure provisions of
both BCRA and applying to independent expenditures are likely
to survive even an overruling of Austin.205) But whatever the
reasons, this limited past involvement argues against a sudden
ten-figure flood of corporate funds into federal elections.
B. Ramifications for Election Law
The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United potentially
could have a much more fundamental effect on election law
generally and so on elections in the long-term. Whether this
potential is realized turns in part on whether the Court limits
itself to overruling McConnell or also overrules Austin. The
overruling of McConnell would represent the rejection of a
relatively new precedent-less than eight years old-and one
that has already been sharply curtailed by the subsequent WRTL
202. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURES, 2006 5-6 (summarizing data from five states, including
California) (2007), available at http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportVie
w.phtml?r=333.
203. See id. at 27 (noting that in Washington state independent
expenditures relating to three Supreme Court races totaled more than the total
amount of contributions to the six candidates in those races); FPPC, supra note
199, at 4 (noting that in some California state legislative races independent
expenditures totaled up to half of the funds available in each race).
204. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 219-23.
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decision.206 Furthermore, a choice by the Court to step back from
overruling Austin might suggest that a majority of the Court is
willing to accept the pre-McConnell legal landscape as in fact
constitutional or, at least, that Austin is due respect as
established precedent. Certainly much of the parsing of the
opinions under this scenario would be to see whether Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito either write or join opinions
that support Austin or simply, as they did with respect to
McConnell in WRTL, carefully avoid opining on Austin.207
If the Court were to overrule Austin, the likely election law
ramifications are much more significant. First, such an
overruling would necessarily also overrule the BCRA § 203
prohibition on corporate (and union) funding of electioneering
communications, as that ruling explicitly relied on Austin.208
Second and more importantly, if the Court overruled Austin
there would also be significant ramifications for the definition of
what is a political committee or PAC.209 Briefly, an entity
becomes a PAC if its major purpose is to influence federal
elections and it solicits contributions of over $1,000 or makes
expenditures of over $1,000, with these terms limited to
contributions given to influence elections (e.g., evidenced by a
fundraising appeal that makes it clear that is the planned use of
the funds) and expenditures made to influence elections.210 For
these purposes, as interpreted by the FEC, influencing elections
includes making independent expenditures.211 Being classified
as a PAC has significant ramifications, as a PAC is prohibited
from receiving corporate or union contributions, contributions
from individuals are limited in amount, and PACs must also file
detailed disclosure reports regarding contributions and
expenditures.212
206. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 80; see also supra note 195 (discussing why a decision
reaching corporate spending would likely also apply to union spending).
209. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
210. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2006); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
211. See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem .. . and the Buckley Problem,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 957-58 (2005).
212. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006).
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The overruling of Austin would, however, lead almost
inevitably to the question of whether entities that solely engage
in independent expenditures can, constitutionally, be subject to
the existing PAC limitations. If both individuals and
corporations must, constitutionally, be permitted to engage in
unlimited independent expenditures on speech, can an entity
that only engages in such expenditures (i.e., does not make
contributions to candidates or political parties) be subject to at
least the contribution limits imposed on a PAC? It would seem
the answer would be no. This issue is already making its way
through the federal courts in the form of two cases, where the
plaintiffs are challenging certain limits on individual
contributions used by entities to make independent expenditures:
EMILY's List v. FEC and SpeechNow.org v. FEC.213
Third and probably most importantly, the overruling of
Austin might foreshadow one further step with respect to finding
existing campaign finance laws unconstitutional. This step
would be a determination that the total prohibition on corporate
contributions to candidates-while individuals are still permitted
to make such contributions, albeit subject to limits-cannot be
sustained constitutionally.214 That is, if corporations cannot be
treated differently from individuals for independent expenditure
purposes under the First Amendment, what justification is there
for treating corporations differently than individuals for
campaign contribution purposes? While there are some plausible
counter-arguments, such as the potential use of corporations by
individuals to evade the limits on individual contributions
(assuming the entire Buckley contribution/expenditure divide,
213. See EMILY's List v. FEC, No. 08-5422 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2009)
(holding unconstitutional FEC regulations requiring nonprofit corporations
that make both independent expenditures and, through a PAC, campaign
contributions to pay for a portion of their independent expenditures with hard
money, i.e., funds raised subject to per individual donor contribution limits);
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction that would have enjoined the FEC from imposing hard
money contribution limits on funds raised by a PAC engaged solely in making
independent expenditures), appeal docketed, No. 08-5223 (D.C. Cir. July 23,
2008).
214. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1), 441b(a).
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and therefore those limits, are not also vulnerable215), an
overruling of Austin at least raises this question. The same
rationale would also support a challenge to the BCRA prohibition
on corporate contributions to political parties, an element in the
pending case of Republican National Committee v. FEC in which
the RNC is challenging various applications of the prohibition on
soft money contributions to national political party
committees.216
The one element of the existing campaign finance laws that
should survive even an overruling of Austin is the disclaimer and
disclosure provisions that apply not only to electioneering
communications but to express advocacy as well.217 It is true
that one of the governmental interests furthered by these
provisions is to aid in the enforcement of the prohibitions and
limits on the funding for such communications.218 Even if,
however, the Court eliminates these prohibitions and limits by
overruling Austin, two other important governmental interests
would still be furthered by these provisions.219 First, they serve
the independent purpose of providing the electorate with
additional information about a candidate by disclosing who
supports and who opposes that candidate.220 Second, they also
help to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption-
even if "corruption" is defined in a strict quid pro quo sense-by
exposing to public view the sources of electoral support so that
any "bought" official's actions may be more easily traced to the
215. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that at least some of
the Justices believe limits on both contributions and expenditures are, or may
be, unconstitutional).
216. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, No. 08-1953 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 13,
2008).
217. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(c), (f) (2006).
218. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); MCFL, 479 U.S. 238,
262 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1976).
219. This is in contrast to the extra disclosure provisions relating to BCRA's
millionaire's amendment that the Court struck down in Davis, as those
provisions only apparently served to aid the enforcement of the unconstitutional
millionaire's amendment and so were not justified by any governmental interest
absent that amendment. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2459, at 2774-
75 (2008).
220. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67.
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provision of this support.221 These interests are particularly well
served by disclosure provisions in the Internet age, when such
information is readily and speedily available.222 Indeed, in
McConnell the Justices considered these reasons so compelling
with respect to the BCRA-imposed electioneering
communications disclosure provisions that only one member of
the Court found them unconstitutional, as compared to the four
Justices who objected to the corporate and union funding
prohibition with respect to such communications.223
The bottom line is that a decision in Citizens United that only
overruled McConnell in part might signal that in the Court's
view Congress has only gone slightly past the outer boundary of
constitutionally permissible campaign finance regulations with
respect to corporations and so would not either have seismic
effects on such laws immediately or foreshadow future
fundamental changes. Of course, such a decision might only
represent a way station on the path to more fundamental change,
as WRTL appears to have been, but it is at least possible it would
represent a terminus instead. A decision that overruled Austin
could, however, easily foreshadow even more significant election
law changes with respect to the definition of political committees
and the limit on corporate contributions to candidates and
parties, thereby foreshadowing a breaching of not only the
corporate expenditure dam but possibly of the corporate spending
dam almost in its entirety.224
221. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
222. See, e.g., FEC, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORTS AND DATA,
http://www.fec.gov/disclosure.shtml. Cf. Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict
Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743 (2003) (describing how courts have
increasingly cited the availability of self-help technology as demonstrating a
less restrictive means for serving an inserted governmental interest,
particularly with respect to governmental restrictions on speech).
223. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing the availability of disclosure requirements as one of
the reasons why the non-distortion theory is not sufficient to support the
prohibition on corporate funding of independent communications); id. at 275-76
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting he differed from
all of his colleagues in concluding that the BCRA electioneering
communications disclosure provisions are unconstitutional).
224. Unless and until Buckley is overruled, however, both the federal
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C. Possible Ramifications for Federal Tax Law
There is one other significant ramification if the Supreme
Court were to overrule Austin, particularly if my prediction that
the Court would still uphold the disclaimer and disclosure
provisions is incorrect. That ramification is for federal tax law
and the ways it currently classifies nonprofit organizations that
seek to be tax-exempt.
Federal tax law divides tax-exempt nonprofit organizations
into effectively three categories with respect to candidate-related
activities: organizations that are prohibited from supporting or
opposing candidates for elected office; organizations that are
permitted to support or oppose candidates but not as their
"primary" activity; and organizations that have as their primary
activity supporting or opposing candidates.225 The first category
is principally charities--organizations that are eligible to receive
tax deductible contributions as well as being exempt from income
tax.226 The second category includes social welfare groups such
as Citizens United, labor unions, and business and trade
associations such as chambers of commerce and industry
groups. 227 The third category is so-called "527" organizations,
named after the Internal Revenue Code section that provides
them with exemption from federal income tax but also generally
requires extensive public disclosure of their contributors and
expenditures.228 While all of these entities file public reports of
their finances with the IRS, generally only 527 organizations are
government and the various states will presumably be able to place limits on
corporate campaign contributions comparable to the limits already in place for
individuals. See supra notes 29, 32 and accompanying text; see also National
Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 20 (listing state limits on
campaign contributions, including states that permit corporate campaign
contributions but subject to limits).
225. See Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice,
87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 637-40 (2007) (describing these categories).
226. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3) (2006).
227. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(4)-(6)(2006); John Francis Reilly & Barbara A.
Braig Allen, Political Campaigns and Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4),(c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, at L-1 to L-3 (2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf.
228. See 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2006).
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required to disclose publicly the identities of their donors.229
Finally, it is important to recognize that whether a given activity
supports or opposes a candidate for federal tax purposes is
determined based on all the relevant facts and circumstances.
For example, whether a communication supports or opposes a
candidate does not depend solely on the presence or absence of
"magic words" or other narrowing test as, is the case with
election law, but instead looks at the full context and content of
the communication.230
For numerous reasons, even if business corporations are
freed to pay directly for electioneering communications or
express advocacy, they are for the most part not likely to do so.
For example, most businesses have no desire to possibly offend a
significant part of their customer base by becoming so directly
connected with candidate-related messages. It is therefore much
more attractive to contribute to a group-such as a Citizens
United, a union, or an industry group-that offers both a
separation from the message and the ability to collect funds from
numerous sources and so achieve economies of scale. While
disclaimer and disclosure requirements, if they survive the
Court's scrutiny, would still allow some tracing back to the
business corporation funders, that connection would be much
more indirect (and those requirements might not survive the
overruling of Austin under any conditions, although I believe
they will). The attractiveness of this approach is demonstrated
by the fact that even for candidate-related communications that
business corporations can currently legally fund, those
communications were primarily paid for by intermediate tax-
exempt organizations, whether well known ones such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce or innocuously named obscure ones such
as the Senior Coalition.231
229. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 527(j)(3)(B) (contributor information reporting for 527
organizations), 6104(d)(3)(A) (2006) (exempting tax-exempt organizations other
than private foundations and 527 organizations from having to publicly
disclosure their donors).
230. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. (June 18, 2007); Mayer, supra
note 225, at 641-44.
231. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 47, at 27-30 (while lacking specific
donor information, identifying business-favoring groups, including the U.S.
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Assuming this pattern continues to hold in the wake of an
overruling of Austin, there will likely be a surge in candidate-
related communications by these intermediary tax-exempt
organizations. Even under a McConnell-only overrule scenario,
with disclaimer and disclosure requirements still in place, there
would still be a preference to use organizations other than 527s
because of the FEC's recent successful enforcement efforts to
require 527s to be treated as PACs (and so subject to contribution
limits)-an obvious step given that 527s by definition must have
influencing elections as their major purpose. 232 Under an Austin
overrule scenario, especially if the disclaimer and disclosure
requirements did not survive, the relative anonymity of giving to
tax-exempt organizations other than 527s would make them
particularly attractive and so sharply increase the use of such
entities.
The pressure such a turn to the middle category of tax-
exempt organizations would create is on two aspects of the
federal tax rules and enforcement of those rules. First, there is
the issue of how much candidate-related activity is too much, i.e.,
how much makes that activity "primary" and so pushes the
organization into the 527 category. 233 For decades the IRS has
failed to clarify this term, which appears to have led many
groups-particularly in the wake of the 527 disclosure rules
enacted by Congress in 2000-to confidently assert they qualify
Chamber of Commerce and the Seniors Coalition, that spent significant funds
on election-related communications, probably mostly provided by corporations);
see also FPPC, supra note 199, at 48 (listing the numerous entities through
which even the largest supporters of independent expenditures relating to
California state and legislative candidates funneled their support); STEPHEN R.
WEISSMAN & KARA D. RYAN, SoFT MONEY IN THE 2006 ELECTION AND THE
OUTLOOK FOR 2008: THE CHANGING NONPROFITS LANDSCAPE (2007) (documenting
some of the largest nonprofit and, usually, tax-exempt organizations that were
active in 2006 federal elections), available at http://www.cfinst.org/books-report
s/pdfHNPSoftMoney_0608.pdf.
232. See WEISSMAN & RYAN, supra note 231, at 3-6 (describing the FEC's
recent enforcement efforts in this area); Paul S. Ryan, 527s in 2008: The Past,
Present, and Future of 527 Organization Political Activity Regulation, 45 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 471, 491-96 (2008).
233. See ABA Members Comment on Exempt Organizations and Politics, 45
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 136, 152-54 (2004) (describing the uncertain definition
of "primary" in this context).
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for this middle category despite extensive candidate-related
activities.234 Second, there is the relatively vague facts and
circumstance test for determining whether a given activity
actually supports or opposes a candidate.235 Apparently
anticipating the pressure on this second aspect of the tax laws,
the same election lawyer who initially brought the Citizens
United case, Jim Bopp, along with the James Madison Center for
Free Speech, has already launched two cases attacking this
federal tax standard as being unconstitutionally vague.236 If
successful, these cases could lead to a significant narrowing of
what constitutes support of or opposition of a candidate for
federal tax purposes and so open the door for groups to qualify
for the middle category even though they engage in many
activities that likely have an election-related effect.237
The demonstrated inability of the IRS to apply these two
standards also does not bode well for maintaining the proper
categorization of nonprofit corporations that are tax-exempt
organizations. Because it relies on filed tax returns, the IRS has
a backward-looking enforcement process that often does not
address potential violations until many years after the fact.
While that backward looking and delayed approach may be
appropriate with respect to tax collection-where the passage of
time can be recognized through requiring the payment of interest
on unpaid but owed taxes-it is poorly suited for policing political
activity that is aimed solely at a soon-to-occur election.238 The
IRS is further hindered by a lack of enforcement resources; as I
have documented elsewhere, audits of tax-exempt organizations
234. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 47, at 8, 49-52 (listing possible
violators of the "primary" limitation).
235. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
236. See Catholic Answers, Ltd. v. United States, No. 2009-00670 (S.D. Cal.
filed Apr. 3, 2009); Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, No. 2009-
000144 (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 3, 2009). Bopp has also successfully represented
parties challenging campaign finance laws before the Supreme Court in
numerous other cases including, most recently, WRTL, 551 U.S. -, 127 S .Ct.
2652 (2007) and Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
237. See, e.g., WRTL, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (describing the ads
found not to be the functional equivalent of express advocacy); id. at 2697-99
(Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining why these ads likely had an electoral effect).
238. See Mayer, supra note 225, at 673.
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are few and far between, and even the staff dedicated to such
organizations have many issues to pursue other than candidate-
related activity.239
It is therefore reasonable to predict that if the Court
overrules McConnell in part, and especially if it overrules Austin,
there will be a surge of corporate funds flowing to this middle
category of tax-exempt organizations to fund candidate-related
communications. Furthermore, in a post-Austin world, that flow
may be hidden from public view if, contrary to my prediction, the
election law disclosure requirements are also struck down
because such entities are not required to publicly disclose their
donors under federal tax law.240 The IRS is ill-equipped to deal
with such a surge, even if it presses or exceeds the legal limits for
such organizations. Supporters of stricter campaign finance laws
would therefore be wise to anticipate issues arising under this
separate but related body of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Citizens United case will likely be the vehicle for a shift
in campaign finance law, although how significant a shift
remains to be seen. Up until now, the addition of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito to the Supreme Court has led to what,
at least on their face, were only marginal changes in the Court's
campaign finance jurisprudence.241 The explicit request by the
Court for the parties in this case to address the continued
viability of two precedents, when the Court could easily have
disposed of the case on relatively narrow grounds, appears to
signal a more radical shift, especially when combined with
statements of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in
earlier campaign finance cases. The strongest argument for
securing a fifth vote against such a change, at least with respect
to the Austin case, is one based on stare decisis, but it is far from
clear whether that argument would be persuasive to one or both
239. See id. at 672-73.
240. See Reilly & Allen supra note 229 and accompanying text.
241. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2769 (2008); WRTL, 551 U.S.
__ 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
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of these Justices.
The Court could still choose to make a relatively incremental,
although significant, change by only reversing the relevant
portion of the McConnell decision. Such a decision would still
strike down a significant campaign finance law and major part of
BCRA, but one that has already been undermined by the Court's
previous WRTL decision, and it would leave in place the differing
treatment of corporate-funded communications-albeit limited to
express advocacy-as well as almost certainly the disclaimer and
disclosure requirements for a broader range of communications.
It might also signal that further shifts would be unlikely. The
effect of such a decision on elections, therefore, would be
relatively limited, and its effect on election law might also be
relatively small.
The Court could instead, however, choose to overrule Austin
as well. If it does so, not only would a much more significant part
of campaign finance law be eliminated, but such a ruling could
easily foreshadow even more dramatic changes with respect to
how political committees can constitutionally be defined and with
respect to the over century-old prohibition on corporate campaign
contributions. It also likely could create significantly more
pressure on the federal tax law rules governing politically active
nonprofit corporations that are also tax-exempt, pressure the IRS
is ill-equipped to address. If those predications are correct even
in part, such a decision could therefore usher in an era of not
only increasing corporate funding of election-related
communications but potentially of significantly less disclosure
regarding the role of corporations in elections. The volume of
such corporate spending almost surely will not be as large as
some have suggested, if both the pre-BCRA history and the
amount of corporate spending in states that permit corporate
funding of independent expenditures with respect to state and
local elections are any indication. There is little doubt, however,
that corporate leaders will continue to care about who is elected;
candidates will continue to care about corporate-paid election-
related communications, and if corporations have substantially
greater freedom to pay for such communications, those
communications will undoubtedly occur. And we all will
experience the effects, whether they are greater information
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about candidates and a more robust public debate or an
outpouring of corporate funded communications that drown out
other voices and unduly influence elected officials to favor
corporate interests over the public interest.
